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There may be a way to maintain a monistic wavefunction ontology, but it is 
certainly not trivial to see what that way is 





Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle have made an original proposal for a version 
of decoherent histories quantum mechanics which is specifically tailored so as not 
to imply the emergence of multiple quasi-classical worlds. I argue that there is an 
explanatory gap in the proposal but that there remains an important insight. That 
insight might be used to tackle what can be seen as an outstanding problem for 
Hugh Everett III’s ‘“relative state” formulation’ of quantum mechanics. At least, 
so long as that view is understood to give ontic priority to the wavefunction. The 
argument employs a recent novel analysis of self-location within any sort of 
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1 All Coherence Gone 
 
‘A quantum universe can be described by many decohering sets of alternative 
coarse-grained histories - many realms’.  So wrote Jim Hartle ([2010], p. 94). 
Characterized in that way, decoherent histories quantum mechanics (DHqm) is 
suggestive of Hugh Everett III’s ‘“relative state” formulation’ (RSqm) in the 
version currently championed by theorists such as Simon Saunders and David 
Wallace1. But Hartle and Murray Gell-Mann, both involved in the development of 
DHqm, have long been reluctant to concede that many realms, multitudes of 
emergent quasi-classical worlds, exist. And that’s understandable; the idea that we 
have vast numbers of doppelgangers living divergent lives on other planets which 
are constantly emerging from an underlying physical reality can seem a somewhat 
extravagant hypothesis which is to be avoided if possible.2 
Of course, it may well be that our universe is spatially infinite. 
Contemporary cosmology supposes that we inhabit a causally isolated region with 
a current radius of about forty-one billion lightyears. The visible firmament is on 
our past lightcone, a hypersurface of that so-called Hubble sphere. A spatially 
infinite universe may well contain a countable infinity of such Hubble spheres 
which are perfectly isomorphic to the one we suppose ourselves to inhabit3. That 
would also yield hosts of doppelgangers living parallel and divergent lives. But it 
appears to be a contingent matter whether a spatially infinite universe contains 
infinitely many galaxies. In that case, maybe we have multitudinous 
doppelgangers and maybe not. But many see RSqm as entailing that similar 
legions exist as a physically necessary consequence of quantum mechanics. 
Furthermore, if Hartle’s realms were real, that can seem to imply that we and our 
environment are constantly branching into myriad worlds which would 
                                                
1 For discussion and references see Saunders ([2010a], pp.  8-12) and Wallace ([2010a]), ([2012], 
pp. ???). 
2 For a recent argument that RSqm is not in fact committed to the existence of a mulititude of 
quasi-classical worlds see Barratt ([2011]). 
3 On the assumption of the ‘Bekenstein bound’, which entails that the number of possible 
observable physical states in a finite volume of space is finite. 
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conventionally be described as possible rather than actual4. In trying to free 
DHqm of this spectre Gell-Mann wrote: 
 
To use the language we [he and Hartle] recommend is to address the 
familiar notion that a given system can have different possible 
histories, each with its own probability, it is not necessary to become 
queasy trying to conceive of many ‘parallel universes’, all equally 
real. ([1994], p. 138)  
 
Decoupling DHqm from RSqm has not proved so easy, but in a new paper Gell-
Mann and Hartle ([2011]) claim to have achieved their goal of having DHqm 
without the many worlds which they take to be entailed by RSqm. Their argument 
turns on a concept of ‘extended probabilities’. These have values outside the range 
0-1 but are precisely related to conventional probabilities with values within that 
range (ibid., p. 4, eqn. 2.2). The extended probabilities apply to fine-grained 
histories and it is the decoherent coarse-graining of sets of fine-grained histories 
which yield the conventional probabilities attaching to coarse-grained histories. 
The upshot is a novel account of, for instance, a two-slit experiment. For an 
electron arriving at the detector screen as part of the interference pattern it is true 
that it passed though only one of the slits. But it is not possible to assign 
probabilities to the electron having passed through the left slit or the right slit. 
Only extended probabilities can be assigned to these fine-grained alternatives, 
implying that it would be impossible in principle to settle a bet on which of the 
alternatives actually occurred (ibid., p. 3). 
 Downstream from the slits, the characteristic interference pattern in the 
waveform of the electron is to be understood as the coarse-graining of an 
ensemble of fine-grained histories. The squared modulus of amplitude yields 
conventional probabilities but the waveform is to be understood as describing a 
notional (imaginary) ensemble of fine-grained histories only one of which exists. 
Here ‘history’ is being used in the sense of a temporally extended object, not 
merely a description. The single extant electron is somewhere but only an 
                                                
4 Some RSqm theorists suggest that branching can be understood in terms of the divergence of 
previously isomorphic universes. I shall say more about that in the final section. 
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extended probability can be assigned to any possible region where that electron 
may be. The idea that the ensemble of fine-grained histories is an imaginary 
theoretical device and only one of those histories actually exists is central to Gell-
Mann’s and Hartle’s attempt to avoid the many worlds of RSqm. As they put it:  
 
This real history is described by embedding it in an ensemble of 
comparable imagined fine-grained histories, not unlike the familiar 
ensemble of statistical mechanics. (ibid., p. 1) 
 
Describing the fine-grained histories requires a choice of preferred variables and 
Gell-Mann and Hartle write: 
 
The fine-grained histories are described by a preferred set of 
variables which we take to be those of a sum-over-histories 
formulation of quantum mechanics. They are histories of particle 
positions in the case of particles, four-dimensional field 
configurations — both bosonic and fermionic — in the case of 
quantum field theory, and histories of geometries and fields in the 
case of semiclassical quantum gravity. Histories of these variables 
are assumed to be the most refined description of the system 
possible. 
A strong case can be made that these histories are adequate for 
the prediction of all observable quantities. (ibid., p. 3) 
 
But, accepting that assumption, there still seems to be a problem with Gell-
Mann’s and Hartle’s proposal. Their one true fine-grained history is rather like a 
lone ant in an anthill. The erratic path which the ant follows may well be identical 
to that of an ant interacting with a host of fellows, the ant may move as if it were 
one of a community even if it’s all alone, but if no such community exists any 
causal explanation of why the ant moves thus and so looks obscure. There’s a 
fundamental difference between the proposed notional ensemble and the ‘familiar 
ensemble of statistical mechanics’. It is that for the classical system there is a 
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simple dynamics internal to one instance of the ensemble. But Gell-Mann’s and 
Hartle’s unique fine-grained history has no such simple internal dynamics. As 
they put it: 
 
The set of all fine-grained histories between an arbitrary pair of 
times t0 and tf is the set of all such paths {qi(t)} between these two 
times. They are continuous but typically non-differentiable. (ibid., 
p.3)  
 
The unique fine-grained history is only calculable because it behaves as if it were 
interacting with other members of the ensemble. Histories which have not 
decohered interfere non-negligibly. But if Gell-Mann and Hartle were right then 
quantum interference would not exist as a physical process. It would be purely 
imaginary. Now, it may be possible in some sense that there is one fine-grained 
history with an internal dynamics which is extremely complex and which is 
describable as if it were one of an ensemble of histories mutually interacting in a 
way described by the evolution of the wavefunction. But, on the face of it, isn’t it 
more plausible that the dynamics of each fine-grained history is what it is because 
the mutually interacting ensemble exists? 
I shall not attempt to press that point further. What I’m concerned to show 
here is that if the ensemble of fine-grained histories is regarded as extant rather 
than imaginary then Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s work may help to resolve what 
some have seen an outstanding problem for RSqm. It has long been overlooked by 
many working with Everett’s relative state interpretation that it provides no 
coherent realist account of what’s going on in the paradigm two-slit experiment. 
According to RSqm what passes through the slits is the wavefunction of the 
electron. But what, precisely, is that? Tim Maudlin ([2010]) stresses that this 
fundamental ontological question remains unanswered. In what follows I’m going 
to argue that Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s characterization of fine-grained histories in 
terms of extended probabilities, coupled with a novel interpretation of the location 
of an observer within a multiverse, can yield an answer to the question which 
Maudlin poses. The assumption that the Gell-Mann/Hartle ensemble exists, rather 
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than just one element of it, need not in any way threaten Hartle’s claim that 
‘Extended probabilities give a simple and general way of formulating quantum 
theory ([2008], p. 1).5  
 
2 Self-Location in a Multiverse 
 
Maudlin’s problem has to do with the constitution of philosophers’ tables and 
chairs. It can seem that according to RSqm they are nothing but seething masses 
of wavefunction. But if Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s one fine-grained history really 
were all that exists then a table could, for instance, be understood as being 
constituted by a temporal fragment of a history involving particles with definite, 
albeit non-differentiable, trajectories. The wavefunction would be banished, so to 
speak, to the domain of the notional ensemble. 
However, if the GMH ensemble (Gell-Mann/Hartle) were taken as extant 
rather than notional then the wavefunction would become instantiated by that 
multiplicity of fine-grained histories. For the wavefunction is the origin of the 
dynamics of a single fine-grained history by way of that history interacting with 
its fellows. The trajectory of a particle in a fine-grained history is calculated by 
Gell-Mann and Hartle as if that history were but one element of a causally 
interacting ensemble. But if the ensemble exists the dynamics of a fine-grained 
history is just a physical part of the actual dynamical evolution of the ensemble, 
which is the instantiation of the wavefunction. 
In that case our local environment would seem to be constituted by a sort of 
minimal slice of wavefunction. The idea would be this. If the ensemble exists then 
the one coarse-grained history which we inhabit would be underlain by a 
multitude of mutually interacting fine-grained histories. But presumably our own 
bodies and brains would be constituted by elements of only one of those fine-
grained histories. Again, to be clear, the term ‘history’ here is being used in the 
sense in which Gell-Mann and Hartle use it, that is to say as being a temporally 
extended object. 
                                                
5 For an alternative approach to providing a fundamental ontology for RSqm see Wallace and 
Timpson ([2010]). 
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 Each of us would have a multitude of doppelgangers in environments 
which were isomorphic at the coarse-grained level but anisomorphic at the fine-
grained level. For a bunch of such doppelgangers about to observe an electron 
detected at the screen of a two-slit apparatus there would be some doppelgangers 
relative to each of whom the relevant electron in each of their fine-grained 
histories had gone through the left slit and some relative to whom the relevant 
electron in their fine-grained history had gone through the right slit.  
On this picture our philosophers’ table is constituted by a minimal slice of 
wavefunction in the sense that we as observers are only ever instantiated by one 
fine-grained history, even if the other fine-grained histories of the ensemble exist. 
The table which a given observer sees would be a table sharing a particular fine-
grained history with that observer. But a change of perspective is possible which 
allows the whole wavefunction, not just a minimal slice of it, to inhabit our 
observed environment. The inspiration comes from reflection on a genre of 
discussion which has been prominent in analytic philosophy of mind in recent 
decades involving thought experiments to do with Twin Earth6. We are asked to 
imagine two matched doppelgangers, each on one of two nearly isomorphic 
Earthlike planets. Because these thought experiments are directed towards 
understanding the relation between a creature’s mentality and its environment, a 
restricted environmental anisomorphism is usually introduced. 
Until recently it has been universally assumed that in a Twin Earth setup 
there are two numerically distinct subjects, one on each planet, and the discussion 
focuses on whether or not aspects of the representational content of the subjects’ 
minds differs in virtue of the environmental anisomorphism. However, it turns out 
that it’s possible to interpret the setup as involving a single subject with a single 
mental life which is doubly instantiated, just as any matched pair of objects on the 
planets instantiate one and the same physical form. The full details of this novel 
interpretation of doppelgangers are to be found in Tappenden ([2011b]) and it 
would be inappropriate to set out the arguments at length here, but I shall outline 
the salient points. 
                                                
6 See Putnam ([1975]) for the seminal paper. 
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For the sake of simplicity, begin by imagining that the twinned planets are 
perfectly isomorphic. One on your left and one on your right. On the planets are a 
matched pair of doppelgangers, DoppelgangerLeft and DoppelgangerRight (DL and 
DR). Imagine being able to speak with these doppelgangers. What you get back is 
apparently two streams of perfectly isomorphic verbal behaviour. The idea now is 
that you understand the responses not to be two numerically distinct loci of verbal 
performance, but a single locus. The single verbal performance is doubly 
instantiated, it’s instantiated by the sonic emissions of  both DL and DR. 
There is a single subject, Una, who in some sense has a single body. But 
that body is somehow constituted by both DL and DR. Getting to understand the 
constitution of objects in Una’s environment, including her own body, is an 
important part of interpreting Una as being a single subject. On this unitary 
interpretation of doppelgangers, as opposed to the conventional plural 
interpretation, DL and DR do not constitute loci of minds. There is a single mind 
which is instantiated by some sort of composite of DL and DR. The nature of the 
composition is central to what follows. 
Bear in mind that it is not only Una’s verbal performance which gives us a 
window on her as a subject. All her intentional behaviours are likewise 
instantiated by composites of the muscular articulations of DL and DR. When Una 
reaches out to pluck an apple DL and DR show arm-moving-applewise 
articulations. So all the objects in Una’s environment which she indicates and 
refers to in her behaviours are somehow to be understood as composites of 
isomorphic pairs of counterpart objects on the two isomorphic planets. The 
‘apple’ which Una plucks must somehow be a composite of the appleLeft and the 
appleRight.  
Imagine that we interpret Una as thinking of a table that it is round. On a 
standard representational view of mind it is supposed that Una entertains the 
thought because she deploys a mental representation. It is perhaps most plausible 
that that representation is manifest as a cerebral process7. On that assumption, in 
                                                
7 ‘Extended mind’ theorists currently claim that some mental representations may be constituted 
by elements of an organism’s local environment but that is controversial and anyway does not 
affect the central idea here. See Menary ([2010]) for disparate views on the issue.  
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Una’s case what constitutes the single mental representation she deploys is some 
sort of composite involving the pair of relevant isomorphic cerebral processes 
going on in the heads of the two doppelgangers. 
Ordinarily, for a mental representation to represent a table’s being round it 
is supposed to be the vehicle of a representational content which is expressed by 
the proposition ‘T is round’ where T is the table in question. How the 
representation comes to bear its content is controversial but need not concern us. 
However, in Una’s case it appears that what she’s thinking about is not a table but 
a composite of isomorphic tables. So in order to coherently interpret Una as a 
single subject it is necessary to understand her as thinking not about a table but 
about what might be called a 2-table, where a 2-table does not just include any old 
pair of isomorphic tables but rather a corresponding pair of isomorphs on matched 
planets of the Twin Earth genre. Clearly that genre of multiverse may contain any 
number of isomorphic worlds of the sort Una’s doppelgangers inhabit so there’s 
scope for 3-tables, 4-tables and so on, assuming that worlds are understood as 
finite and causally isolated, like Hubble spheres. 
So we might attribute the content expressed by ‘2T is round’ to Una’s 
mental representation, where 2T is the 2-table in question. But this raises a 
problem. It makes no sense to say of a pair of tables that it is round. What is 
needed is to modify the predicate. The appropriate modification is to introduce the 
idea that an n-table is n-round if and only if each of its component tables is round.  
So we attribute the content ‘2T is 2-round’ to Una’s mental representation. A 2-
table is 2-round if and only if each of its two component tables is round. A two-
table is an object which constitutes what appears to Una as a table and it consists 
of two isomorphic components, one on each planet. Where the conventional plural 
interpretation of doppelgangers would suppose that there were two subjects with 
matched bodies on a pair of isomorphic planets each thinking of a local table that 
it is round, on the novel unitary interpretation we have the single subject, Una, 
thinking of a single 2-table that it is 2-round.  
The unitary interpretation can be applied to understanding the thoughts, 
speech and intentional actions of a single subject spanning any number of 
isomorphic worlds. But this is from a third-person point of view. We imagine the 
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interpreter as somehow standing outside that multiverse; the god’s eye 
perspective. But how might we think of ourselves as inhabiting a multiverse 
where each of us spans a multitude of isomorphic worlds?  
Surely we must take it that what we see as a table is a table, not an n-table. 
Putting ourselves in Una’s shoes we cannot admit that what we take to be a table 
is not a table. So a way has to be found to understand how a table in our 
environment could somehow be constituted by isomorphic physical objects, each 
in a different world.  
Bearing in mind that the model being using here is that of spatially 
separated worlds akin to isomorphic Hubble spheres it would seem that a round 
table in our observed environment cannot be round in virtue of being an aggregate 
of round objects. If we observed a table to weigh a dozen kilograms that table 
could not be a spatial aggregate of a multitude of objects each weighing a dozen 
kilograms. The weight of a spatial aggregate is the sum of the weights of its parts. 
In the domain of classical physics objects can only be aggregates of spatial 
and temporal parts. Later we shall see that in quantum physics a further type of 
aggregate is available but in the meantime it will be instructive to remain in the 
classical domain. There, the way forward is to suppose that an object in our 
environment may be a set of isomorphic elements. Willard Van Orman Quine 
once proposed that any particular, such as a table, could be understood as being a 
self-membered singleton set ([1969], pp. 31-2). Adapting this to the classical 
model before us, the idea now is that a table in our environment may be a 
multipleton set, reducing to being a self-membered singleton if there’s no 
multiverse. But if we span a number n of isomorphic worlds we can imagine that 
any number of them might suddenly disappear. We have as yet no solution to 
David Hume’s problem of how any sort of physical necessitation can exist and so 
in positing a classical multiverse we cannot exclude the possibility of any 
particular world in that multiverse coming to a sudden end. And given that any 
particular world can end at any time there is the possibility of us being left 
spanning any sample of the original collection but still faced with a table. So any 
subset of the original table must also be a table. 
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Any table we’re left with could then be understood to have some observable 
property if and only if each of its subsets had that property. It’s necessary to 
introduce the qualification ‘observable’ because clearly the number of elements 
constituting a table which is a multipleton set cannot be the same for each of its 
subset tables. However, it’s plausible that if we were to span a multitude of 
isomorphic worlds the magnitude of that multitude would not be observable; if the 
number of worlds should change we would not notice any difference. Later, we 
shall see that changes in the number of worlds which we span can be understood 
to be related to the concept of physical probability but for the moment, just 
thinking about a philosopher’s table sitting still with a MacBook atop, let’s take 
the number of worlds we span at any given moment as unobservable. 
This leads to the following proposal for the constitution of objects in our 
environment if we are to coherently understand ourselves as being single subjects 
spanning a multitude of classical worlds. Corresponding matched objects in 




Any environmental object O is a set of self-membered singletons 
which are parallel world counterparts and O possesses some 
observable property F if and only if all the subsets of O possess F. 
Tappenden ([2011b], p. 133)8 
 
According to Concrete Sets, if we inhabit a multiverse consisting of a number n of  
isomorphic worlds then any table we observe in our local environment has n! 
subsets which are all isomorphic tables and our table is round because all its 
subset tables are round. The idea has so far been applied to thought experiments of 
the Twin Earth genre where quantum mechanics is not an issue. I shall come to 
                                                
8 This proposal is incompatible with David Lewis’s Main Thesis in his Parts of Classes ([1991], 
p.7), which is not a problem in itself but worth mentioning given the celebrity of Lewis’s engaging 
idea. 
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applying the idea to an ensemble of fine-grained histories later. But first it will be 
useful to pursue these thoughts further in a classical context. 
 
3 A Classical Model for Linear Superposition 
 
Return to the god’s eye view of our two isomorphic planets, one on the left and 
one on the right, and imagine that Una reports seeing a black box before her. What 
we see from our detached perspective is two matched black boxes and we can 
understand Una as speaking truly if we take her to be referring to a 2-black 2-box. 
But suppose that, unbeknown to Una, the interiors of the matched black boxes are 
causally isolated from their surrounding environments allowing a contained 
anisomorphism between the two planets. One box contains a black cat and the 
other contains a white cat. Una’s 2-box thus harbours a 2-cat since each 
component box contains a cat, but the 2-cat is neither 2-black nor 2-white since 
the component cats are neither both black nor both white. The 2-colour of the 2-
cat can thus be said to be indeterminate. 
Imagine now what would plausibly happen if Una were to unmask the 
contents of her 2-box. On the left planet DL’s retinas would register an image of a 
black cat and on the right planet DR’s retinas would register an image of a white 
cat. We could expect Una to undergo personal fission into a subject seeing a black 
cat and a subject seeing a white cat. The analogy with the RSqm fission account 
of what would happen to a subject unveiling Schrödinger’s proverbial boxed cat is 
unmistakable. There has been much discussion of how an informed subject about 
to make an observation using, say, a Stern-Gerlach apparatus to measure spin 
should understand their predicament if believing RSqm9. Here I shall simply 
assume that such a subject can intelligibly suppose that their situation is in some 
sense like that of a subject who believes that a stochastic process takes place and 
expects to see either one or the other possible outcome with a given probability. 
Since it is difficult to see how such analyses can be understood in terms of 
genuine probabilities I shall speak of fission-probability (f-probability) for 
                                                
9 For a variety of views see Saunders and Wallace ([2008]); Greaves and Myrvold ([2010]); 
Saunders ([2010b]); Papineau ([2010]); Tappenden ([2011a]). 
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branching contexts. F-probabilities take values 0-1 and guide betting behaviour in 
the same way as probabilities, setting aside some bizarre and controversial 
exceptions.10 
To be clear about this, the idea is that on a currently defensible view of 
RSqm the following holds. If a subject knows that s/he will undergo personal 
fission into subjects observing different outcomes A, B, C… then prior to fission 
the subject can intelligibly assign f-probabilities to observing A, observing B, 
observing C and so on. Such an observer must assign a probability of 1 to seeing 
each outcome simultaneously as distinct persons. That is hard to imagine but 
nonetheless the claim is that the informed pre-fission subject can make 
assignments of f-probabilities to the outcomes A, B, C, etc. which can serve to 
guide behaviours, such as betting, in a similar way to probabilities. Understanding 
transtemporal identity in fission contexts, how it is that an observer prior to an 
observation can expect to retain their personal identity through fission, need not 
pose a problem11. There then arises the question of what values the f-probabilities 
should take. For RSqm much work has gone into attempting to show that those 
values should be equal to the relevant squared moduli of amplitude.12 
So, if Una were to be informed about her situation prior to opening the 2-
box, the analogy with RSqm would suggest that she should regard her situation as 
somehow being like that of being able to assign probabilities to the seeing of a 
black or a white cat. Since Una is to fission into two subjects a first thought might 
be that she should assign an f-probability of ½ to each outcome. But on further 
reflection this becomes problematic. For suppose Una spanned three isomorphic 
planets and were faced with a 3-box where two component boxes contained 
matched black cats and the third contained a white cat. We should still, on the 
unitary interpretation of doppelgangers, expect that Una would fission into one 
observer seeing a black cat and one seeing a white cat. Which might again suggest 
that if informed she should suppose the situation as being somehow like having a 
                                                
10  For some discussion of these exceptions see Papineau ([2003]), Tappenden ([2004], [2011a], 
pp.118-21),  Price ([2010]), Wallace ([2012], pp. ??) 
11 For two alternative approaches to this see Saunders and Wallace ([2008]) and Tappenden 
([2011a], p. 115). 
12 This work was begun in Deutsch ([1999]). For its most recent manifestation see Wallace 
([2010b], [2012], pp.??). 
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fifty-fifty chance of seeing black or white. And yet it’s tempting to think that the 
proportions of parallel planets containing counterpart black cats and white cats 
might somehow be analogous to the squared moduli of amplitude in the quantum-
mechanical case. 
This suspicion can find some backing, for suppose that Una spans some 
very large finite number of parallel planets. The infinite case brings with it the 
notorious measure problem of cosmology of which I’ll say more shortly. And 
now, into the classical model, let’s introduce the idea of an irreducibly stochastic 
process which selects whether a boxed cat on a given planet is black or white. We 
can imagine that Una’s multi-box is equipped with a multi-button and when she 
presses the multi-button a stochastic process takes place on each planet. And 
suppose that on each planet the stochastic process is such that there’s a two-thirds 
chance of the cat turning out black and a one-third chance of its turning out white. 
For a large number of planets there’ll be a high probability that the proportions 
across the set will be two-thirds for black cats and one-third for white cats. 
Now, by way of a lemma, let’s for a moment abandon the unitary 
interpretation of doppelgangers and revert to the standard plural interpretation. In 
that case we have one subject on each planet where a stochastic process takes 
place and if each of those subjects were well-informed of the setup and were to 
state their chance of seeing a black cat, they would be speaking truly if they were 
to say that the probability of seeing a black cat was two-thirds.  
But if we now revert to the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers the only 
way for it to be consistent is for Una to be interpreted as speaking truly if she says 
that her situation is somehow like that of there being a probability of two-thirds 
that she will see a black cat. That must be so because when Una speaks here vocal 
behaviour is isomorphic to the verbal behaviours of her constituent 
doppelgangers, when those doppelgangers are understood to be loci of verbal 
performance according to the standard plural interpretation. The unitary 
interpretation is only possible if Una’s verbal behaviour can be understood to refer 
to something in her environment which corresponds to what is taken to be in the 
environments of her constituent doppelgangers on the plural interpretation. So 
Una, well-informed about her predicament, must be interpreted as assigning an f-
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probability of two-thirds to seeing a black cat, despite expecting to fission into 
only two subjects, one seeing a black cat and the other seeing a white cat. 
If talk of f-probabilities in branching scenarios is acceptable then it should 
be possible on the unitary interpretation to take Una as speaking of f-probabilities 
rather than probabilities. But this alternative would collapse if the f-probabilities 
of the unitary interpretation were not numerically equal to the probabilities of the 
standard plural interpretation. Rational betting behaviours could not then 
intelligibly be the same on the two interpretations. One might say, ‘so much the 
worse for the unitary interpretation’ but that wouldn’t be justified because in the 
situation where Una fissions into two subjects making different observations there 
is no overriding reason to suppose that she should assign an f-probability of ½  to 
seeing one or the other outcome. And so there is no justification for throwing out 
the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers on those grounds. 
To emphasise this point, think again about the comparison with RSqm. If a 
quantum measurement is set up which has two outcomes, one with square 
modulus of amplitude equal to two-thirds and the other one-third then RSqm 
demands that those values determine the prior f-probabilities. The intuition that a 
subject should assign f-probabilities of a half to each outcome because the 
upstream subject expects to fission into two downstream subjects is trumped by 
the arguments which entail that it’s the Born rule which determines f-
probabilities. Likewise, the argument which I’ve just given for the classical 
analogue can counter a similar naïve intuition. 
The classical setup does not require that Una has a multi-button which 
initiates a stochastic process. I just used that idea for ease of exposition. 
Stochasticity could simply be introduced in determining the ‘initial conditions’ for 
classical worlds, as in any classical deterministic theory. In that case the picture 
which emerges for the classical model is that if we have a large collection of 
worlds which are parallel up to a point but with differing initial conditions then an 
observer spanning a fibre-bundle of linear histories of such worlds will be subject 
to personal fission when observing differing phenomena as that fibre-bundle of 
parallel histories differentiates into sub-bundles of divergent histories.  And the 
proportions of worlds in branching sub-bundles will tend to be numerically equal 
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to the informed subject’s f-probability assignments if the initial number of worlds 
is large but finite. However, there is now no need to confine the classical model to 
finitude.  
 
4 Resolving the Cosmological Measure Problem 
 
How are f-probabilities in the classical model to be understood when a subject 
spans an infinite number of worlds? As is well known, the concept of proportion 
cannot apply to infinite collections. But the unitary interpretation of 
doppelgangers offers a neat solution to this problem since its coherence depends 
on any utterance made by the unified subject being qualitatively identical to those 
attributed to the individuals DLeft , DRight etc., by the conventional plural 
interpretation of doppelgangers.  
As we saw earlier, if the conventional plural interpretation is applied and the 
subjects in each world are assumed to be well-informed of the probabilities 
associated with a stochastic process then those subjects can speak truly about 
those probabilities. But for the unitary interpretation to work any apparent talk of 
probabilities by the likes of DL and DR must numerically tally with Una’s talk of 
f-probabilities. And this must be so whether the collection of doppelgangers is 
finite or infinite. So the measure problem for the classical model evaporates if the 
unitary interpretation is adopted because that interpretation of an observer’s 
predicament when spanning an infinite number of worlds supplies exactly the 
measure which is needed. Talk of a probability of value N for a given outcome by 
well-informed subjects on each planet according to the plural interpretation 
translates into talk of an f-probability of value N for the corresponding multi-








5 Superslice me 
 
We can now attempt to apply these ideas to a GMH ensemble of fine-grained 
histories where a fine-grained history is understood in terms of extended 
probabilities, always remembering that the picture relies on the acceptability of 
the choice of preferred variables. Return to the two-slit experiment and consider 
an electron’s wavefront just prior to impinging on the detector screen. It somehow 
contains the characteristic interference pattern. And suppose that what Gell-Mann 
and Hartle take to be an imaginary ensemble of fine-grained histories is wholly 
real. From the point of view of one of the fine-grained histories there is a relevant 
electron somewhere, but for any given spatial region only an extended probability 
can be assigned to that electron’s being there. Considered as a whole, the 
ensemble of fine-grained histories thus furnishes a multitude of relevant electrons, 
one in each history, which are following non-differentiable trajectories with 
associated extended probabilities. 
Let’s now apply the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers to this setup. 
The idea would be that in each fine-grained history there is a single doppelganger, 
like DL and DR in the earlier classical example. Certainly the fine-grained histories 
are not perfectly isomorphic. The dynamics in each fine-grained history in the 
ensemble is determined by mutual causal interaction which depends on 
anisomorphisms between those histories. But the histories in the ensemble are 
only anisomorphic at the fine-grained level. At a level of coarse-graining 
determined by decoherence the histories constituting the ensemble are isomorphic. 
What follows depends on the assumption that isomorphism at this level is all that 
is needed to apply the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers. That is, fine-
grained anisomorphism between doppelgangers is not sufficient to determine 
qualitatively distinct mental lives for them. The intuitive support for this is that 
such subjects can only observe coarse-grained aspects of their environment. 
Applying the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers, the setup for an 
electron passing through a two-slit apparatus is that the observer is a single 
subject spanning an ensemble of fine-grained histories and the single electron in 
the observer’s environment is somehow constituted by a multitude of relevant 
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electrons, one in each fine-grained history. What is the mode of constitution of the 
observer’s single electron? Should we appeal to the Concrete Set rule and 
consider the single environmental electron to be a multipleton set? No, it turns out 
that in the quantum context that’s not necessary. 
In the classical model Concrete Sets excludes aggregates because in the 
classical setup we were considering worlds as Hubble spheres distributed in space. 
A spatial aggregate of apples weighs more than an apple. But within currently 
defensible metaphysics a type of aggregate can be described in which an apple is 
an aggregate of timeslices. According to the worldtube version of four-
dimensionalist metaphysics, popularly known as worm theory, an apple is an 
aggregate of timeslices. And when an apple has a stable weight for a period, each 
timeslice of the apple over that period weighs what the apple does. In the quantum 
context might there be another type of aggregation available which is more akin to 
temporal aggregation than spatial aggregation? 
It turns out that there is. It was first introduced, so far as I know, in 
Tappenden ([2000], pp. 105-8). When an object is in superposition, as is the 
single electron passing through the two-slit apparatus, the components of that 
superposition can be understood to be its ‘superslices’13. When an object is an 
aggregate of superslices the whole has some definite property if and only if all the 
superslices share that property. This is similar to the idea that a temporally 
extended object only has a determinate mass if its mass does not change during 
the course of its existence. So, in the case of Schrödinger’s famous cat, if its dead 
and live superslices each has a mass of two kilos the superposed cat-in-the-box 
has a mass of two kilos also.  
The upshot is that in applying the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers to 
the quantum context we do not need to have recourse to set theory as was the case 
for the classical model. Mereology will do. Given the concept of superslices, 
coupled with the idea that the GMH ensemble of fine-grained histories is real, the 
                                                
13 The term ‘superslice’ was used because it names a component of a superposition which is 
analogous to a temporal part, ie. a timeslice. This of course presumes a ‘preferred basis’ for the 
decomposition of the superposition. But the assumption of a defensible basis is already required 
for Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s analysis, as they acknowledge. 
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Concrete Set rule for the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers in classical 
contexts can be transformed for use in RSqm. 
To see how this could work, keep in mind first of all than Gell-Mann’s and 
Hartle’s proposal is that our observed environment is constituted by a single fine-
grained history. But the observable properties of our environment are not the fine-
grained properties, they are emergent, coarse-grained, properities of the single 
history. And given the assumption that only a single fine-grained history exists the 
implication is that linear superpositions do not exist; they are notional in the sense 
that they are features of what Gell-Mann and Hartle take to be the imaginary 
ensemble. 
Schrödinger’s cat will do perfectly well to illustrate the point despite 
practical difficulties. For Gell-Mann and Hartle the inside of the box is constituted 
by part of a single fine-grained history. Coarse-graining of that history at a given 
moment yields a probability that there is a live cat present and a probability that 
there’s a dead cat. It’s one or the other but we don’t know which. The single 
history is perfectly definite, so it’s relevant coarse-grained feature must either be a 
live or a dead cat. But if, as I’m suggesting, the GMH ensemble is taken as not 
being notional but as actually existing, then the live and dead cats are both 
present. And that can be made intelligible if a single subject is taken to span an 
ensemble of fine-grained histories so that the box in the observer’s environment 
contains a cat which has a live superslice and a dead superslice, analogous to 
Una’s concrete set cat which has white and black cats as subsets. 
Minimal superslices of an environmental object are analogous to traditional 
instantaneous timeslices. They are the finest parts into which an environmental 
object can be superpositionally decomposed and each of those parts resides in a 
distinct fine-grained history, where a history is understood as a temporally 
extended object. An aggregate of minimal superslices may also be a superslice of 
an object, just as an aggregate of minimal timeslices of a temporally extended 
object may also be a temporal part of that object. The specification of ‘observable’ 
properties is inherited from the Concrete Set rule of the classical model because 
there is no reason to suppose that the number of fine-grained histories spanned by 
a given macroscopic environment at a time is observable. As we have already 
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seen, and are about to see again, it is a measure of relative numbers of worlds 
spanned by a subject at earlier and later times which connects with observable f-




Any environmental object Q is an aggregate of minimal superslices 
which are fine-grained history counterparts and Q possesses some 
coarse-grained property P if and only if all the superslices of Q 
possess P. 
 
6 A Constitution for Wavefunction 
 
Equipped with Superslices we can now apply the unitary interpretation of 
doppelgangers to the idea of an extant GMH ensemble to provide an account of 
the two-slit experiment for RSqm. A single electron passing through the two-slit 
apparatus is an aggregate of superslices. The minimal superslices of the electron 
are the relevant counterparts in each of the fine-grained histories which the 
observer spans, in the sense that the observer has a component doppelganger in 
each of the fine-grained histories. Those histories are isomorphic at the coarse-
grained level which constitutes the decohered environment which the observer 
inhabits, including the two-slit apparatus, flashes of lightning outside the 
laboratory window, and so on. 
Relative to the single observer yielded by the unitary interpretation of 
doppelgangers, one electron superslice has passed through the left slit and one has 
passed through the right slit (for the sake of simplicity I ignore marginal pathways 
such as those passing outside of or tunneling through the barrier in which the slits 
are made). Each of those electron superslices is composed of minimal fine-grained 
superslices, each in a single fine-grained history. For each of those minimal fine-
grained superslices only an extended probability can be assigned to its passing 
either through the left slit or the right slit. This is analogous to a football match 
having two timeslices, one before half-time and one after half-time. Each of those 
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timeslices is composed of a multitude of minimal timeslices. The temporal 
decomposition of the first and second halves of the match is usually thought of as 
continuously infinite, going down to instantaneous timeslices, though a more 
realistic analysis may involve a finite decomposition down to timeslices of Planck 
duration. 
 For the electron wavefront about to impinge on the array of electron 
detectors which constitutes the screen there is a distribution of those fine-grained 
electron superslices, each with an associated extended probability in relation to 
being at a particular finite volume of location. As decoherence takes place with 
the interaction between the observer’s single environmental electron and the 
screen, the ensemble of fine-grained histories branches into many coarse-grained 
histories, in each one of which a different detector in the array fires. Each of those 
coarse-grained histories is shared by a multitude of fine-grained histories which 
are anisomorphic. The image is of a bundle of fibres being separated into sub-
bundles, like hair being divided in into tresses. 
For each of the coarse-grained histories corresponding to the firing of a 
particular detector the squared modulus of amplitude yields an f-probability 
associated with the electron being detected by that particular detector. And those 
f-probabilities will have a distribution corresponding to the familiar interference 
pattern, manifest over time as the number of hits is recorded for each detector 
when the screen is exposed to a stream of electrons. 
Given that for a single fine-grained history coarse-graining yields values of 
probabilities by the Born rule, it must follow that for the unitary interpretation of a 
GMH ensemble the corresponding values of f-probabilities are likewise 
determined. That follows from an argument parallel to the one by which the 
unitary interpretation of a classical multiverse resolves the cosmological measure 
problem.  
As the observer’s single superposed environmental electron interacts with 
the screen the observer fissions into multiple observers, each seeing an electron 
activate a different detector in the array which makes up the screen. The single 
electron in each of the downstream observers’ environments is a superslice of the 
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object which was the single electron in the upstream observer’s environment14. 
And the single electron in each of the downstream observers’ environments has a 
host of minimal electron superslices as parts. Each downstream observer spans a 
multitude of fine-grained histories which is a part of the original ensemble.  
This provides an account of branching for RSqm which puts flesh on 
wavefunction. In general, any object in an observer’s environment, such as a 
table, can be understood to be constituted by wavefunction in the sense that the 
wavefunction of the table is the manifestation of an ensemble of temporal 
segments of fine-grained histories which the observer spans as a single subject. 
The observer’s body and brain spans the same ensemble of fine-grained histories 
as are spanned by the observed table at the time it is observed, that table being 
understood to be composed of many superpositional parts at the fine-grained 
level, many superslices.  
 
7 Varieties of Divergence 
 
A few loose ends need tying up. Firstly, the whole proposal depends on taking the 
unitary interpretation of doppelgangers seriously. The perspective which yields 
objects in our environment as constituted by wavefunction is that which supposes 
us to be observers who span a host of ‘parallel universes’. But the idea of a single 
subject spanning a multitude of worlds in that way usually strikes people as 
surreal on first acquaintance. Nowhere in modern philosophy of mind has this 
idea been mentioned outside the single recent paper to which I’ve referred. It is 
only reasonable to expect readers to be sceptical about such a novel idea which 
has not yet been subjected to substantive exposure in the philosophy of mind 
community. However, for the moment it does seem that there is no good reason to 
reject this idea beyond a gut sense of hilarity. 
What I have said falls within the tradition of thinking about RSqm which 
Hilary Greaves once dubbed the fission programme. There is an alternative 
programme which has gained much force recently thanks to the work of Simon 
                                                
14 This way of speaking assumes Ted Sider’s analysis of transtemporal identity. See Tappenden 
([2011a], pp. 115-6) for details and references. 
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Saunders and Alastair Wilson. It’s what might be called the divergence 
programme. It will be useful to say something about the relation between the ideas 
presented here and current discussion of that alternative. 
There seem to be two independent strands to the divergence programme. 
One was introduced by David Deutsch ([1985], p.20). He has subsequently 
radically altered that original idea ([1997], pp. 43-5), ([2002]), ([2011], pp. 258 -
303) but has retained the concept of divergent parallel universes. The other strand 
was effectively first fielded by Saunders and Wallace ([2008a], [2008b]). The aim 
has been to provide a straightforward solution to the problem of making sense of 
probabililty in RSqm. According to the fission programme, a subject about to 
conduct a quantum measurement with multiple outcomes cannot assign a genuine 
probability to observing any of those outcomes, other than the probability of 1 of 
observing each of them simultaneously. Within the fission programme this 
problem is arguably met by positing what I’ve called f-probabilities and 
maintaining that f-probabilities can take on the same role as probabilities in 
guiding behaviours such as the paradigm betting against given odds. But the 
approach has some controversial consequences, as I mentioned earlier. 
The divergence programme is much simpler in this respect. Where a 
quantum measurement has outcomes A, B, C… the divergence view posits 
parallel universes which are isomorphic up to the time of measurement and then 
diverge, result A occurring in one set of worlds, result B in another set and so on. 
The idea is then that probability arises out of self-location. Prior to the 
measurement a subject can assign genuine ignorance probabilities to inhabiting a 
world which is one of a set where A will occur, or one of a set where B will occur 
and so on. It is argued that the probabilities so assigned should be exactly those 
entailed by the Born rule. 
Wereas Deutsch originally introduced the multiplicity of parallel worlds as a 
posit, what he called Axiom 8, Saunders has recently argued that the picture is 
already implicit in the formalism of quantum mechanics ([2010]). And Wilson 
([2011], [2012]) has built on Saunders’ idea to construct a divergence view of 
RSqm which takes its inspiration from David Lewis’s ‘modal realism’ ([1986]).  
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If the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers were applied to any of these 
ideas the result would be that from a subject’s point of view the divergence would 
induce personal fission. For the quantum measurement of A, B, C… there would 
be a single subject spanning a host of parallel universes and that subject would 
undergo fission into a subject spanning the universes with the A result, a subject 
spanning the universes with the B result and so on. 
In that case the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers would only seem to 
bring trouble. The simple probabilities of divergence would have to be replaced 
by the f-probabilities of fission. And an extant GMH ensemble can provide a 
causal explanation of divergence, as we’ve seen. Deutsch’s, Saunders’ and 
Wilson’s parallel universes would be branching bundles of interfering GMH 
histories, isomorphic at the coarse-grained, quasi-classical level but anisomorphic 
microscopically. And the classical cosmological measure problem wouldn’t arise 
for this sort of divergence since the Born measure applies in the quantum domain. 
A perceived virtue of divergence is that it has none of the bizarre 
consequences which are arguably entailed by fission when it comes to quantum 
Russian roulette and suchlike. On the other hand, the unitary interpretation of 
doppelgangers should be welcome in the analysis of cosmological multiverses 
since it provides a long sought-after resolution of the measure problem without 
the requirement of a finite limit on the number of constituent universes. Cognitive 
science may benefit too, from a rigorous challenge to contemporary semantic 
externalism, ushering the mind back into the body15. And it does seem that the 
unitary interpretation of an extant GMH ensemble allows us to understand how 






                                                
15 Detailed discussion can be found in Tappenden, ([2011b]). 
16 My thanks to David Deutsch, Simon Saunders and Alastair Wilson for useful comments. And 
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